Links Between Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility : Lessons Learned

With the world and its structures becoming ever more complex, and the nature of future employment becoming ever more unpredictable, the notion of ‘cognitive flexibility’ has a high profile in educational and psychological debate. The contributions in this volume analyze the nature of cognitive flexibility, as well as the impact of different types of beliefs on cognitive flexibility. Making adequate decisions requires considering input from a variety of continuously evolving sources rather than adhering to predetermined procedures. Adopting a position in a debate necessitates the critical evaluation of different alternatives, while solving a problem entails selecting appropriate problem-solving strategies. Meanwhile, studying requires students to integrate a range of interventions, and treating a patient involves making a differential diagnosis. The common factor, cognitive flexibility, lies at the core of effective functioning in complex, domain-specific environments. Cognitive flexibility can be described as the disposition to consider diverse information elements while deciding on how to solve a problem or to execute a learning-related task in a variety of domains. The concept of ‘disposition’ implies that individuals will not always demonstrate cognitive flexibility even if they are in principle able to act in a cognitively flexible way. The notion does not require that alternatives are always deliberately considered, which is why this volume’s tandem discussion of beliefs is key element of the discussion. Beliefs play a central role in cognitive flexibility and relate to what individuals consider to be important, valid and/or true. Of specific interest is the relationship between epistemological beliefs and cognitive flexibility, especially as a particular subset of epistemological beliefs seems to be a prerequisite to a cognitively flexible disposition. Front Matter....Pages i-viii Introduction....Pages 1-5 Personal Epistemology: Nomenclature, Conceptualizations, and Measurement....Pages 7-36 The Generative Nature of Epistemological Judgments: Focusing on Interactions Instead of Elements to Understand the Relationship Between Epistemological Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility....Pages 37-60 Spontaneous Cognitive Flexibility and an Encompassing System of Epistemological Beliefs....Pages 61-77 Personal Epistemology and Philosophical Epistemology: The View of a Philosopher....Pages 79-103 Beliefs About Abilities and Epistemic Beliefs: Aspects of Cognitive Flexibility in Information-Rich Environments....Pages 105-124 Cognitive Flexibility and Epistemic Validation in Learning from Multiple Texts....Pages 125-140 Development of Cognitive Flexibility and Epistemological Understanding in Argumentation....Pages 141-156 Medical Trainees’ Epistemological Beliefs and Their Cognitive Flexibility....Pages 157-174 Analyzing and Developing Strategy Flexibility in Mathematics Education....Pages 175-197 Conclusion....Pages 199-204 Back Matter....Pages 205-213 3.1.3.1 Statement II: Stability Is Normality in Educational Psychology and Cognitive Flexibility Is the Exceptional Case3.1.4 Flexibility of Epistemological Beliefs; 3.1.5 Epistemological Resources: The Perspective of Hammer and Elby; 3.1.6 The Generative Nature of Epistemological Judgments; 3.1.6.1 Statement III: Focusing on Detailed Interactions Between Complementary Cognitive Elements as the Smallest Unit to Understand the Flexibility of Epistemological Judgments Is Necessary; 3.2 The Relationship Between Epistemological Beliefs, Epistemological Judgment, and Cognitive Flexibility 2.3.3 Argument Concerning Conception-Oriented Form of Personal Epistemology2.3.3.1 "Epistemic" Versus "Epistemological"; 2.3.3.2 "Beliefs" Versus Other Descriptions; 2.3.4 Review of Process-Oriented Form of Personal Epistemology; 2.3.5 Argument Concerning Process-Oriented Form of Personal Epistemology; 2.4 Section II: Measurement of Epistemological Beliefs; 2.4.1 Review by Measurement Clusters; 2.4.1.1 Cluster I: Likert-Type Measures of Unitary Positions or Belief Dimensions; 2.4.1.2 Cluster II: Direct Questions About the Nature of Knowledge and Knowing Links Between Beliefsand Cognitive Flexibility; Contents; Contributors; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 Cognitive Flexibility; 1.2 Epistemological Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility; References; Chapter 2: Personal Epistemology: Nomenclature, Conceptualizations, and Measurement; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Literature Search; 2.3 Section I: Nomenclature and Conceptualizations; 2.3.1 The Dual Nature of Personal Epistemology; 2.3.2 Review of Conception-Oriented Form of Personal Epistemology; 2.3.2.1 Conceptions About What; 2.3.2.2 Cognitive Form, Status, and Range Chapter 3: The Generative Nature of Epistemological Judgments: Focusing on Interactions Instead of Elements to Understand the Relationship Between Epistemological Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility3.1 The Relationship Between Epistemological Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility; 3.1.1 Preliminary Remarks; 3.1.2 Cognitive Flexibility and the Cognitive Flexibility Theory; 3.1.2.1 Statement I: Cognitive Flexibility Is Normality Not an Exceptional Case; 3.1.3 The Mechanism of Cognitive Flexibility and Epistemological Beliefs: First Conclusions 2.4.1.3 Cluster III: Measures of Judgments About Assertions2.4.1.4 Cluster IV: Measures of Salient Meaning Making; 2.4.1.5 Cluster V: Measures of Separate and Connected Knowing; 2.4.2 Methods of Measuring Epistemological Beliefs; 2.4.2.1 Inference from Related Beliefs; 2.4.2.2 Directly Assessing Epistemological Beliefs; 2.4.2.3 Inference from Epistemological Judgments and Salient Meaning Making; 2.4.3 Argument Concerning the Measurement of Epistemological Beliefs; 2.5 Conclusions; References