Can Animals Be Persons?

Can animals be persons? To this question, scientific and philosophical consensus has taken the form of a resounding, 'No!' In this book, Mark Rowlands disagrees. Not only can animals be persons, many of them probably are. Taking, as his starting point, John Locke's classic definition of a person, as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself the same thinking thing, in different times and places," Rowlands argues that many animals can satisfy all of these conditions. A person is an individual in which four features coalesce: consciousness, rationality, self-awareness and other-awareness, and many animals are such individuals. Consciousness--something that is like to have an experience--is widely distributed through the animal kingdom. Many animals are capable of both causal and logical reasoning. Many animals are also self-aware, since a form of self-awareness is essentially built into the possession of conscious experience. And some animals are capable of a kind of awareness of the minds of others, quite independently of whether they possess a theory of mind. This is not just a book about animals, however. As well as being fascinating in their own right, animals, as Claude Levi-Strauss once put it, are "good to think." In this seamless interweaving of the empirical study of animal minds with philosophy and its history, this book makes a powerful case for the idea that reflection on animals allows us to better understand each of these four pillars of personhood, and so illuminates what means for any individual--animal or human--to be conscious, rational, self- and other-aware Can animals be persons? To this question, scientific and philosophical consensus has taken the form of a resounding, 'No!' In this book, Mark Rowlands disagrees. Not only can animals be persons, many of them probably are. Taking, as his starting point, John Locke's classic definition of a person, as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself the same thinking thing, in different times and places," Rowlands argues that many animals can satisfy all of these conditions. A person is an individual in which four features coalesce: consciousness, rationality, self-awareness and other-awareness, and many animals are such individuals. 0Consciousness-something that is like to have an experience-is widely distributed through the animal kingdom. Many animals are capable of both causal and logical reasoning. Many animals are also self-aware, since a form of self-awareness is essentially built into the possession of conscious experience. And some animals are capable of a kind of awareness of the minds of others, quite independently of whether they possess a theory of mind. This is not just a book about animals, however. 0As well as being fascinating in their own right, animals, as Claude Levi-Strauss once put it, are "good to think." In this seamless interweaving of the empirical study of animal minds with philosophy and its history, this book makes a powerful case for the idea that reflection on animals allows us to better understand each of these four pillars of personhood, and so illuminates what means for any individual-animal or human-to be conscious, rational, self- and other-aware "According to the standard conception of persons, an individual qualifies as a person if it satisfies four conditions, broadly construed. First, the individual is conscious, in the sense that there is something it is like to be it. Second, it is rational, in the sense that it can execute at least some rational inferences and possesses the required materials for such inferences, such as beliefs and desires. Third, the individual must be self-aware, aware of itself as an individual persisting through time. Finally, it must be other-aware, aware of the mindedness of others. This book argues that many animals can satisfy all of these conditions and so qualify as persons. Unlike recent debates that concern whether we should extend personhood as far as the great apes, it is argued that personhood extends quite widely through the animal kingdom." -- Oxford Scholarship Online According to the standard conception of persons, an individual qualifies as a person if it satisfies four conditions, broadly construed. First, the individual is __conscious__, in the sense that there is something it is like to be it. Second, it is __rational__, in the sense that it can execute at least some rational inferences and possesses the required materials for such inferences, such as beliefs and desires. Third, the individual must be __self-aware__, aware of itself as an individual persisting through time. Finally, it must be __other-aware__, aware of the mindedness of others. This book argues that many animals can satisfy all of these conditions and so qualify as persons. Unlike recent debates that concern whether we should extend personhood as far as the great apes, it is argued that personhood extends quite widely through the animal kingdom. Cover Can Animals Be Persons? Copyright Dedication Contents Preface and Acknowledgments 1. Animals as Persons: The Very Idea 2. The Ghost of Clever Hans 3. Consciousness in Animals 4. Tracking Belief 5. Rational Animals 6. Beyond the Looking Glass 7. Pre-​Intentional Awareness of Self 8. In Different Times and Places 9. Self-​Awareness and Persons 10. Other-​Awareness: Mindreading and Shame 11. Animals as Persons and Why It Matters Bibliography Index