Breakdown of Will

Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. This perspective helps us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from self-defeating behaviors to willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of behavior such as altruism, sadism, gambling, and the "social construction" of belief. Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 CONTENTS 9 PREFACE 11 PART I BREAKDOWNS OF WILL: THE PUZZLE OF AKRASIA 15 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 17 1.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIOR 18 1.2. HOW TO STUDY SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIOR 21 1.2.1 My Approach to the Problem 25 1.3 SUMMARY 26 CHAPTER 2 THE DICHOTOMY AT THE ROOT OF DECISION SCIENCE 27 2.1 IS ADDICTION EITHER A MISTAKE OR A SIMPLE PREFERENCE? 31 2.2 DOES ADDICTION COME FROM PROCESSES THAT VIOLATE THE USUAL LAWS OF MOTIVATION? 32 2.2.1 Classical Conditioning: Does Addiction Come from a Different Kind of Reinforcement? 33 2.2.2 Does Impulsiveness Come from Brain Chemistry? 36 2.2.3 There Must Be a Single Dimension of Choice 38 2.3 SUMMARY 40 CHAPTER 3 THE WARP IN HOW WE EVALUATE THE FUTURE 41 3.1 THE HYPERBOLIC CURVE THAT DISCOUNTS FUTURE EVENTS 42 3.2 IMPLICATIONS OF HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 49 3.2.1 How Utility Theory Can Predict Inconsistency 52 3.2.2 The Self as a Population 53 3.3 THE ADAPTIVENESS OF HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 59 3.4 SUMMARY 61 CHAPTER 4 THE WARP CAN CREATE INVOLUNTARY BEHAVIORS 62 4.1 ZONES OF DURATION OF TEMPORARY PREFERENCES 62 4.1.1 Addictions 62 4.1.2 Compulsions 64 4.1.3 Itches 65 4.1.4 Pains 68 4.1.5 Distinguishing Rewards From Pleasures 72 4.2 INTERESTS COMPETE FOR SELECTION 75 4.3 EMOTIONS ARE A KIND OF APPETITE, BUT LACK OBJECTS 79 4.3.1 Appetites Are Behaviors 81 4.4 SUMMARY 83 PART II A BREAKDOWN OF THE WILL: THE COMPONENTS OF INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING 85 CHAPTER 5 THE ELEMENTARY INTERACTION OF INTERESTS 87 5.1 HOW ONE INTEREST BINDS ANOTHER 87 5.1.1 Extrapsychic Commitment 88 5.1.2 Manipulation of Attention 90 5.1.3 Preparation of Emotion 91 5.1.4 Personal Rules 92 5.2 THE WILL’S ACHILLES HEEL 99 5.3 SUMMARY 102 CHAPTER 6 SOPHISTICATED BARGAINING AMONG INTERNAL INTERESTS 104 6.1 BRIGHT LINES 108 6.2 APPROXIMATING “RATIONAL” VALUATIONS 114 6.3 SUMMARY 118 CHAPTER 7 THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING 119 7.1 WHY DON’T WE KNOW WE’RE BARGAINING WITH OURSELVES? 120 7.2 WOULD INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING ABSORB TOO MUCH EFFORT? 126 7.3 DOES ALL YOUR EXPECTATION OF SELF-CONTROL HAVE TO BE STAKED ON EVERY CHOICE? 127 7.4 SUMMARY 130 CHAPTER 8 GETTING EVIDENCE ABOUT A NONLINEAR MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM 131 8.1 EVIDENCE FROM DIRECT EXPERIMENTS 134 8.2 EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERPERSONAL ANALOG 135 8.3 EVIDENCE FROM THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS ON INTENTION 139 8.3.1 Kavka’s Problem 140 8.3.2 Freedom of Will 143 8.3.3 Newcomb’s Problem 148 8.4 SUMMARY 153 PART III THE ULTIMATE BREAKDOWN OF WILL: NOTHING FAILS LIKE SUCCESS 155 CHAPTER 9 THE DOWNSIDE OF WILLPOWER 157 9.1 SIDE EFFECTS OF WILLPOWER 157 9.1.1 Rules Overshadow Goods-in-Themselves 161 9.1.2 Rules Magnify Lapses 162 9.1.3 Rules Motivate Misperception 163 9.1.4 Rules May Serve Compulsion Range Interests 165 9.1.5 There’s No Formula for Rationality 168 9.2 PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF WILL’S SIDE EFFECTS 169 9.3 SUMMARY 174 CHAPTER 10 AN EFFICIENT WILL UNDERMINES APPETITE 175 10.1 THE LIMITATION OF EMOTION PUZZLE 178 10.1.1 Avoiding Premature Satiation 180 10.1.2 The Adaptiveness of Learned Habituation 186 10.2 SUMMARY 188 CHAPTER 11 THE NEED TO MAINTAIN APPETITE ECLIPSES THE WILL 189 11.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF FACT PUZZLE 189 11.2 THE VICARIOUS EXPERIENCE PUZZLE 193 11.2.1 Empathy as Modeling 195 11.2.2 Negative Empathy 197 11.3 THE INDIRECTION PUZZLE 201 11.3.1 Indirection 203 11.4 SUMMARY 211 CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSIONS 212 NOTES 215 Preface 215 Chapter 1. Introduction 215 Chapter 2. The Dichotomy at the Root of Decision Science 217 Chapter 3. The Warp in How We Evaluate the Future 220 Chapter 4. The Warp Can Create Involuntary Behaviors 224 Chapter 5. The Elementary Interaction of Interests 226 Chapter 6. Sophisticated Bargaining among Internal Interests 229 Chapter 7. The Subjective Experience of Intertemporal Bargaining 231 Chapter 8. Getting Evidence about a Nonlinear Motivational System 232 Chapter 9. The Downside of Willpower 234 Chapter 10. An Efficient Will Undermines Appetite 236 Chapter 11. The Need to Maintain Appetite Eclipses the Will 238 REFERENCES 241 NAME INDEX 261 SUBJECT INDEX 267 "In this book, the researcher who originally proposed hyperbolic discounting theory presents new findings that confirm its validity and describes implications that undermine our most basic assumptions about how self-control works. Hyperbolic discounting theory has provoked much recent controversy in psychology, economics, and the philosophy of mind. It begins with an experimental finding: People devalue a given future event at different rates, depending on how far away it is. This phenomenon means that our preferences are inherently unstable and entails our present selves being pitted against what we can expect our future selves to want. Although the notion of temporary preferences upsets conventional utility theory, it offers radical solutions to problems that have defeated utility theory: Why do people knowingly participate in addictions, compulsions, and bad habits? What is the nature of will? What makes a will weak or strong? Do we in fact need a concept of will at all?" "This book integrates approaches from experimental psychology, philosophy of mind, microeconomics, and decision science. It will be of interest to philosophers concerned with the mind and action theory. By questioning some of the basic assumptions held by social scientists about rational choice, it should be a resource for professionals and students in psychology, economics, and political science."--Jacket Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of behavior such as altruism, sadism, gambling, and the'social construction'of belief. This book integrates approaches from experimental psychology, philosophy of mind, microeconomics, and decision science to present one of the most profound and expert accounts of human irrationality available. It will be of great interest to philosophers and an important resource for professionals and students in psychology, economics and political science. There have been plenty of books and articles that describe how irrational we are - in consuming drugs and alcohol and cigarettes, in gambling, in forming destructive relationships, in failing to carry out our own plans, even in boring ourselves and procrastinating.